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IN THE. SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HENRI NIEMANN, MARIA NIE-
MANN, RENATE NIEMANN, by 
her guardian ad litem Henri Nie-
mann, and HENRI NIEMANN JR. 
by his guardian ad litem Henri Nie-
mann, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, Case No. 8670 
vs. 
GRAND CENTRAL MARK E T-
SUGARHOUSE, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
.• 
(Numbers in parenthesis refer to pages of the 
record. The parties will be referred to here as they ap-
peared in the trial court). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of plain-
tiffs and against defendant for damages sustained by 
plaintiffs from trichinosis caused by eating ground beef 
infested with trichinae and sold by defendant to plain-
tiffs on June 24, 1955. The judgment w.as entered upon 
a verdict returned by a jury. 
The case was submitted to the jury upon the propo-
sitions that if the jury found the ground beef was in-
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fested with trichinae and caused plaintiffs to suffer 
trichinosis then there was either a breach of warranty 
as set forth in Section 60-1-15, Subdivisions 1 and 2, 
·utah c·ode Annotated, 1953, or a violation of Sections 
-!-20-5 and 4-20-8, Subdivisions 5 and 7, referring to foods, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Defendant has made an inaccurate statement of the 
facts and has failed to take into consideration the well 
established rule that in considering a verdict of a jury 
the evidence must be viewed in the light most strongly 
in favor of that party in whose favor the verdict was 
returned. This verdict was for plaintiffs and therefore 
in reviewing the evidence we will follow that rule and 
~tate the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiffs. 
Defendant only raises two points. The first point 
relates to the sufficiency of the evidence and the second 
point to the giving of an instruction and the failure to 
give a requested instruction. 
Rather than revie\v the testimony both under the 
staten1ent of the ease and under the point \Yhere it will 
be involved, \Ve \viii Inerely discuss the eYidence under 
the point where it is relevant. 
STATEI\IENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TESTIMONY SUSTAINS A FINDING THAT DE-
FENDANT SOLD TO PLAINTIFF GROUND BEEF IN-
FESTED WITH TRICHINAE. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION 
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NO. 5 AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION N~O. 9. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TESTIMONY SUSTAINS A FINDING THAT DE-
FENDANT SOLD TO PLAINTIFF GROUND BEEF IN-
FESTED WITH TRICHINAE. 
lTnder the first point in its Brief defendant merely 
attacks the finding which the jury made that defendant 
sold ground beef to plaintiffs which was infested with 
trichinae. By Instruction No. 3 the jurors were instructed 
as follows ( 79) : 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
"In order for the plaintiffs, of (sic) any of 
them, to recover in this ,action, they must prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence the following: 
1. That the ground beef purchased by Mr. 
Niemann from the Grand Central Market, the 
defendant herein, contained sausage, which was 
infected with trichina. 
2. That the plaintiffs, or any one or more 
of them, ate such ground beef containing sausage 
.so infected and contracted trichinosis therefrom. 
3. That the plaintiffs, or any one or more 
of them, were made ill and sustained damages to 
their person by the disease mentioned above, as 
trichinosis." 
The evidence clearly points to the ground beef pur-
chased from defendant as being the cause of the trichin-
osis suffered by plaintiffs. We reach this result through 
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a process of elimination as well as a process of consider-
ing the persons who became infested with trichinosis and 
the severity of that infestation. We start with the indis-
putable and admitted f.act that the four plaintiffs became 
ill with trichinosis (234, 243 and 244). The next 
established fact is that trichinosis can only come, so far 
as practical here, from pork which has not been properly 
treated to kill trichinae ( 242). Trichin.ae is eliminated 
from pork either by cooking, freezing, or using a salt 
process (213, 214). 
Symptoms from trichinosis usually becoine apparent 
to the victim from seven to fourteen days after ingestion 
of the meat and it may be within t"' ... o days or as long as 
four weeks (246). The testimony establishes that on Fri-
day, June 24, 1955, Mr. and Mrs. Niemann went to the 
d~fendant's place of business between 8 .and 9 o'clock 
at night (127, 156). They purchased fruit, potatoes, 
beans, liver, lamb necks, wieners and ground beef (137). 
Upon arrival at home Mrs. Niemann prepared the ground 
beef. It was not put in the refrigerator (156, 183). In 
preparing thi.s ground beef bread spread she put the 
ground beef in a bowl, put salt and pepper on it, cut an 
onion real fine, broke an egg over it and mixed it all to-
gether. It was then spread on bread (127, 170). ~Irs. 
Niemann ate three slices 'vith this spread on it, ~lr. 
Niemann t'vo, the son I-Ienri one and the daughter Renate 
1nerely took a taste of the spread "~ith a fork (162). There 
was some left over and the next day ~Irs. Nie1nann 
finished that (163). Shortly after noon on Saturda3~, 
July ~' the Nien1ann fa1nily left for an outing at Bear 
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Lake (128). On Sunday evening, July 3, Mr. Niemann 
did not feel very well (163). On Monday morning, July 4, 
1\ir.s. Niemann became ill ( 163). Their symptoms were 
the typical symptoms of trichinosis, including fever, 
chills, headaches, sore eyes, ect. (126, 163, 164). Be-
cause of their illness the family left before they had 
planned to do so. They left on the morning of the 4th 
and arrived at home at approximately 1:00 P.~f. (129, 
163). It will be observed that Mr. Niemann came down 
with trichinosis nine days after ingesting the ground 
beef purchased .at defendant's store. Mrs. Niemann came 
down within ten days of eating the meat. These are both 
within the usual limits within which symptoms appear 
after ingesting trichinae infested meat. The son, Henri, 
first noticed an illness coming on on Saturday, July 9 
(176). This was within fifteen days of eating the meat 
and within the limits placed by Dr. King on symptoms 
becoming evident. Renate became sick two or three days 
after Henri ( 183). This also puts her within the limits 
as indicated by Dr. King. 
The Niemanns had a son by the name of Niels who 
did not eat .any of the ground beef spread. He did not 
get trichinosis (127, 173). Also, Mrs. Niemann's mother 
did not eat any of this spread and she did not become 
ill with trichinosis (128, 173). 
Also, it is to be noted that the severity of the cases 
\vas dependent upon the amount of this ground beef which 
each of the members of the family ate. Mrs. Niemann ate 
the most, she had the severest case (242) and, as a matter 
of fact, was confined in the hospital for two weeks (165). 
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Mr. Niemann ate next to the most and his ca.se was the 
next in severity (242). Henri's case was less severe and 
he ate only one slice of bread with this spread on it. 
Renate was the next in line and she had the least severe 
case ( 242). All this, as indicated above, was in accord-
ance with the amount of this spread ingested by each 
of these parties. 
This was the only uncooked meat eaten by the Nie-
manns ( 129). The other meats eaten during the time 
when the Niemanns could have been infested consisted 
of lamb necks, liver and wieners ( 136, 137, 15±). The 
only type of pork eaten before contracting trichinosis was 
some mettwurst purchased from !filler's by Carla 
Schnibbe and given to the Kiemanns the lOth day of l\Iay 
( 137, 155, 188, 189). This \Yas some 53 days, or 7¥2 weeks 
before symptoms of trichinosis became e\ident. In any 
event Niels, the grandmother, and the Schnibbe family 
ate from this ring of mettwurst and none of them con-
tracted trichinosis ( 156, 157, 190). The Niemanns had 
purchased no pork (141). They had never eaten any un-
cooked pork (1±2). 
The foregoing facts created a hard core of evidence 
establi.shing that defendant had sold the plaintiffs the 
infested 1neat. This evidence \Yas in1pervious and innnune 
to any atten1pts by defendant to lessen its effectiveness 
to establish plaintiffs' case. 
This evidence alone \Yonld justify the finding of the 
jury in accordance \Yith Instruction No. 3, supra, that 
defendant sold the infested n1eat to plaintiffs causing 
thent to .suffer trichinosis. Plaintiffs took a further 
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step in proving their case and introduced evidence show-
ing that there was opportunity at defendant's place of 
business for the ground beef to contain pork sausage. 
It appeared from the evidence that defendant .at its 
place of business used only one grinder in preparing its 
ground meat (194). Also, the same pans were used in 
handling both ground beef and ground pork (195). The 
method in which ground meats were produced was de-
scribed by Edwin R. Benzon, who during June of 1955, 
was the meat market manager .at the store where plain-
tiffs purchased the ground beef. During June of 1955, 
three butchers vvere working under Mr. Benzon. The man 
arriving at 8 :00 in the morning would proceed with the 
grinding (204). Beef would first be ground and then 
sausage. Ordinarily, it would not be necessary to make 
any further sausage on .any particular day inasmuch as it 
was made only two or three days a week. However, beef 
1night be ground on more than one occasion and on Fri-
day and Saturday it might be ground five or six times 
after the original batch was made up (205). Contrary 
to defendant's contention this means that beef was ground 
after sausage on the same day (200). Hence, it can be 
seen that opportunity existed for beef to be adulterated 
'vith sausage if great care was not used in cleaning this 
one grinder. This was admitted by Benzon when he testi-
fied a.s follows ( 205, 206) : 
"Q. Are there ways which sausage could get into 
beef~ 
A. Intentionally, or otherwise~ 
Q. Otherwise~ 
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A. No. 
Q. If the machine were not completely washed, 
could it~ 
A. Yes, if it wasn't washed, yes." 
LaMont Richins, the meat supervisor for defendant, 
who had never heard of trichinosis (195) did not elimi-
nate the fact that this adulteration might occur. He 
testified as follows ( 195) : 
"Q. Now, could sausage, some particles of saus-
age be left in the grinder~ 
A. I doubt that very much. 
Q. Could it be~ 
A. I doubt it." 
As might be expected these employees of defendant 
stated that on all occasions the machines ,,-ere thoroughly 
washed, but the jury did not need to believe that all par-
ticles of sausage were removed perfectly on every occa-
sion. The witnesses who testified admitted that men 
under them did the grinding and they 'vere not al\\-ays 
present ( 207). Certainly in view of the testimony of 
the purcha.se of the ground beef and the resulting trichi-
nosis a jury could find that the ground beef contained 
some of this sausage. A very s1nall an1ount of this saus-
age could have caused the infestation suffered by these 
plaintiffs. Defendant's pathologist, Dr. John I-I. Carl-
quist, testified that an ounce of sausage could haYe in it 
100,000 larvae (29±). This is contrary to the stateinent 
in defendant's brief that a s1nall particle of sausage could 
not cause infestation. A housewife 1nerely tasting ra"-
sausage in 1ninute quantities to check seasoning could 
become heavily infected ( 219, 220). 
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Richins testified that immediately after using the 
grinder it was cleaned (193, 194). However, Benzon 
testified that the night shift, consisting of one man, usu-
ally cleaned up and that the grinder was left for him to 
clean unless it had been cleaned otherwise (205). This 
slight discrepancy in te.sti1nony indicates that the manager 
and supervisor could not possibly keep accurate check 
on exactly what was happening in connection with the 
cleaning of this grinder and further strengthened the 
opportunity for the ground beef to contain pork sausage. 
A case in point isM our en v. Great Atlantic & Pacific 
Tea Co., 139 N.Y.S. 2d 375 (affirmed in the Intermediate 
Court of Appeals 1 A.D. 2d 767, 148 N.Y.S. 2d 1 and 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 1 N.Y. 2d 884, 136 
N.E. 2d 715). The facts and law in that case are better 
explained by the words of the court: 
"The plaintiff husband and wife bought and 
cooked some ground round beef at one of the 
stores of the defendant in New York County. It 
is alleged the beef had been contaminated through 
the negligence of the defendant by allowing the 
residue of previously chopped pork to become 
mixed with it and as a result of contamination, 
both of the plaintiffs contracted trichinosis. 
"The defendant through the examination be-
fore the trial of the supervisor in its meat depart-
ment, parts of which examination were read into 
the record on the trial, conceded in detail that it 
had two Hobart grinding machines and that both 
of them were used for grinding beef and pork. 
It is alleged by the plaintiff that after each grind-
ing there is a residue of the meat ground left in 
the machine. In the examination before the trial, 
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the supervisor of the meat department of the de-
fendant stated whichever machine is used to grind 
pork is cleaned out before the beef is ground in 
•t *** l 0 
"I find from my research, it is generally con-
ceded that the trichinella spiralis which is the 
cause of the disease known as trichinosis is not 
usually associated with meat known .as beef. *** 
"The physician who originally attended the 
plaintiffs, diagnosed the illness as trichinosis. 
The same diagnosis was determined by the physi-
cian at the New York Hospital where l\Irs. Mouren 
was for ten days. Mr. :Jiouren was not hospital-
ized. It is alleged Mrs. :Jiouren is still suffering 
from the effects of trichinosis. It seems to me, 
from the testimony that we may exclude all possi-
bilities of infection to the plaintiffs, other than 
the beef which was purchased from and ground 
by the defendant, for the plaintiffs had not eaten 
pork since some time in July when two small cans 
of boiled ham were purchased. \\-:nen a purchaser 
of pork kno"\YS he is buying pork, he can protect 
himself from the infection by thoroughly cooking 
the meat. Not knowing there "\Ya.s pork in the n1eat, 
it was cooked as hamburger and served rare on 
Saturday on "\Yhich the n1eat "\Ya.s purchased and on 
the follo"\Ying day. The plaintiffs kept the meat 
in an electric refrigerator known as Frigidaire. 
said to be manufactured by the General ~rotors 
Corporation, until 1\Irs. :\Iouren "\Yas prepared to 
cook it, on both Saturday~ Septen1her 20, 1952 and 
Sunday, Septe1nber ~1, 1~)32. In the sale of me.at 
by the defendant to the plaintiff husband, there 
was an implied "Tarranty that it "\Yas fit for hun1an 
consumption. I find as a n1atter of la"\v that the 
in1plied \Y.arranty extended to the benefit of the 
plaintiff wife. See Bo\Yinan v. Great .... :\.tlantie & 
Pacific Tea Co., 28± App. Div. 663, 133 N.Y.S. 2d 
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904; \:isusil v. W. T. Grant Co., 253 App. Div. 736, 
300 N.Y.S. 2d 652." 
Another case which i.s closely in point is Flynn v. 
First r..rational Stores, Inc., 296 Mass. 521, 6 N.E. 2d 814, 
wherein tvvo children sought to recover for injuries 
caused by pieces of 'vire in hamburger, or ground steak, 
sold by defendant to their mother. The trial court dir-
ected verdicts for defendant .and on appeal this was re-
versed, holding that it was a question for the jury whether 
or not the wire got into the hamburger while defendant 
'vas processing it. The court stated: 
"And from the evidence that each of the plain-
tiffs was injured by a piece of wire in the very 
first mouthful of steak taken by each, it could be 
inferred that the entire mass of steak contained 
a substantial number of pieces. There wa.s evi-
dence from which it could be inferred that there 
was no vvire in the meat when it came into the 
store. Hence the jury could find that the wire got 
in while the meat was being stored, manufactured 
into Hamburg steak and kept for s.ale at the de-
fendant's store under the defendant's exclusive 
control. They were not obliged to believe the 
testimony of the defendant's manager that it was 
impossible for wire to go through the Hamburg 
machine, even though this witness was called by 
the plaintiffs. ***" 
In Turner v. Wilson, 227 S.C. 95, 86 S.E. 2d 867, the 
court stated: 
"vVhen under the same conditions, several 
person.s who have eaten the same food become 
similarly ill, inference may be warranted that 
food was unwholesome and was cause of illness." 
See also Johnson v. Kansavos, 296 Mass. 373, 6 N.E. 
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2d 434; Davis v. Van Camp Packing Company, 189 Iowa 
775, 176 N.W. 382, 17 A.L.R. 649; Jensen v. Berris, 31 
Cal. Ap·p~ 2d 537, 88 P. 2d 220. 
Defendant's employees testified that every precau-
tion was taken to eliminate the possibility of sausage 
getting into the ground beef. This is routine testimony 
in cases of this kind and can only create a conflict in the 
evidence as to whether or not trichinae in fact got into 
the beef. 
In Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 
163 P. 2d 470, plaintiff had salami and coppe and some 
time later came down with trichinosis. The court recog-
nized the fact that in these cases circumstanial evidence 
1nust frequently be resorted to and stated the rule as 
follows: 
"The plaintiff relying on circumstantial evi-
dence does not have to preclude the possibility of 
all other po.ssible inferences. He simply has to 
establish the reasonableness of his inference by 
a preponderance of the evidence.'' 
In that case atten1pt "~as n1ade to sho\v that all pre-
cautions were taken and the court stated: 
"This evidence is undoubtedly of consider-
able persuasive force. But as opposed to it are the 
facts found by the trial court, and supported by 
substantial evidence, that plaintiff 'vife and her 
t\vo children beea.1ne ill \vi th trichinosis shortly 
after eating the pork in question: that they had 
eaten no other pork for a considerable period 
prior thereto: and that the n1ain sourc.e of the 
infection is diseased pork. It \vas for the trial 
court to weigh the evidence. It.s findings, being 
supported by substanial eYidence and by reason-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
13 
able inferences from the evidence, cannot be dis-
turbed." 
In Kline v. Du.chess Sandwich Company, 14 Cal. 2d 
2·72, 93 P. 2d 799, proof was introduced that precautions 
were taken to prevent any contamination of food from 
occurring. It was held, however, that inasmuch as there 
was contamination in the food this could only create a 
conflict of f.act and in this connection the court stated: 
"But in that regard, notwithstanding undis-
puted evidence to the effect that in the manu-
facture of sandwiches, generally, care had been 
exercised by the said defendant to prevent the 
happening of such an incident as befell one of the 
plaintiffs in the instant case, nevertheless, from 
the admitted f.act that cheeseworms, or 'maggots' 
were present on or in the sandwich that was pre-
pared by the defendant Duchess Sandwich Com-
pany and thereafter sold by defendant Kilpatrick 
to one of the plaintiffs, it becomes undeniable 
that at some time or place some person had failed 
to exercise the proper degree of c.are to prevent 
houseflies or cheese-flies from depositing their 
eggs on some of the material from which the 
sandwiches were manufactured, or the subsequent 
infestation of the particular sandwich in question 
by cheese-worms or 'maggots.' 
Also, in Gindraux v. Ma.urice Mercantile Co., 4 Cal. 
2d 204, 47 P. 2d 708, similar te_stimony was introduced 
showing that defendant operated .a sanitary shop and 
there was no direct evidence that the salami eaten by 
plaintiffs was actually infested with trichina. The trial 
court had granted defendant's motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict and in reversing this ruling 
the ~ourt stated : 
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"There is evidence from which it appears that 
the salami was properly manufactured and proc-
essed according to federal regulations. When so 
treated, the evidence shows that live trichina germs 
are destroyed, and cannot again appear in the 
prepared product. In this case the salami was 
duly inspected and certified by governmental au-
thorities. The premi_ses where the product was 
sold were clean and in all respects sanitary, meet-
ing all requirements in that regard. But against 
the rather persuasive force of this evidence, the 
testimony of the plaintiffs must be considered. 
The evidence in support of plaintiffs' case puts in 
the record the fact that plaintiffs became infected 
with trichinosis within ten days after purchasing 
the salami; that they had eaten no pork for a 
considerable time prior thereto ; and the testimony 
of Dr. 1fonteith and Dr. Alexander that the SYJ.np-
toms of infection from that disease usually appear 
in from six to ten da-ys, and that the only possible 
source of the disease is infected pork. This evi-
dence gives rise to an inference of fact. In count-
less cases such inference has been deemed suffi-
cient to go to the jur~~. n 
Defendant made a valiant, but ineffective, effort to 
sho\v that plaintiffs could haYe beeo1ne infested "-ith 
trichinae fron1 sources other than the defendant company. 
It's main reliance "Tas apparently based on the fact that 
there "Tas an epiden1ic of trichinosis an1ong tl1e German 
speaking people \Yho had purchased Inett\Yurst fron1 a 
1nea t 1narket run by a n1an b~T the na1ne of Suhrmann. 
rrhe t()sti.Ill011)T relating to this subject Inatter \Yas clearly 
i rrelev.ant. The per.sons \Yho contracted trichinosis fron1 
this sonree did not becon1c> siek until so1ne ti1ne in .... -\.ugust, 
1955, \vhielt \\Tas over a n1onth after the plaintiffs here 
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contracted the disease. One of the plaintiffs first became 
ill July 3 and the last one became ill July 11th. There 
could have been no possible connection between plaintiffs' 
trichinosis and Suhrmann's market. True it is that plain-
tiffs had purchased unsalted butter, eggs and cheese from 
Suhrmann's Market, but the evidence was to the effect 
that the Niemanns had purchased nothing from Suhr-
mann since May 1, 1955 (314, 324-326). Hence, the jury 
could have found that Suhrmann's could not have been 
the source of plaintiffs' illness because two months 
elapsed between the time of dealing with Suhrmann's and 
the illness of plaintiffs. The testimony was to the effect 
that symptoms of trichinosis .show up ordinarily between 
seven and fourteen days from ingestion and it might be 
as little as two days or as much.as four weeks (246). This 
eliminates the te.stimony of Hoffman regarding the use 
of the same knife and same show ·case for meats and 
cheese (276, 277). In any event, this testimony of Hoff-
n1an's fell of its own \veight when it appeared th.at he did 
not work for Suhrmann's after March of 1955 (278). 
No meat was purchased by plaintiffs from this place 
( 138) until after they were sick and then it was not eaten 
by them (142, 160, 172). It was given to the dog (160, 
172). 
Defendant .also tried to make much of the fact that 
. the Niemanns on occasion picked up meat scraps for their 
dog and placed it in the refrigerator. The ground beef 
did not find its way into the refrigerator before it was 
first eaten ( 156, 183). 
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These scraps were kept in a sack, were cooked and 
placed in the bottom of the refrigerator . They came in 
contact with no food (146-149). 
Also, defendant contended that plaintiffs ate some 
mettwurst which was delivered to them between April 
and June. The only mettwurst this could be is that which 
was brought to them by Carla Schnibbe. She testified 
that she brought it on the lOth day of !tiay (188). The 
Niemanns testified that it was some time between the 
first and fifteenth of May (155, 178, 184). Even though 
this had been infested it would have been eaten at too 
remote a time to have caused the sickness of July 3 (211). 
There is also the added fact that only part of this stick 
of mettwurst was given to the Xiemanns. The other por-
tion was eaten by the Schnibbe family (190) and the 
Niemann boy, Niels, also ate this mettwurst (184). No 
one in the Schnibbe family were sick from e.ating this 
mettwurst (190) and Niels was not sick (178). Mrs. Nie-
Jnann's 1nother also ate of this mettwurst and was not 
sick (184). This would support a jury finding that this 
1nettwurst could not possibly have been the source of 
plaintiffs' illness. It did not co1ne fro1n Suhr1nann's (138, 
189). 
Defendant called Glen Kilpatrick, an e1nployee of 
the st8:te to testify that Renate told hun in a con\ersation 
in August that the family had mett,Yurst at Bear Lake 
( 265). He testified that she stated her brother had pur-
chased this mettwu1~st at Suhrmann's. In the first place, 
the tin1e between when this could have been eaten and the 
onset of the sympto1ns \V,as too short a tilne and certainly 
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would not come within the limits of the usual time for 
showing of symptoms. However, it was testified definite-
ly that no such state1nent was made by Renate and that 
the Niemann family did not have any mettwurst at Bear 
Lake on this trip (312, 314, 317, 323). It was explained 
by plaintiff Henri Niemann, the son, that after the family 
had become sick, on July 9, 1955, he purchased what is 
called in Germany mettwurst but what is called here 
salami ( 178, 318). 
Counsel for defendant in his brief has seen fit to drag 
in by the forelock a number of cases brought against 
Suhrmann & Jordan Meat & Livestock Company. These 
cases are entirely different from the case now being 
considered. They involve persons who contracted trichi-
nosis in August, 1955, and who ate mettwurst purchased 
from Suhrmann's the latter part of July or the first part 
of August. Plaintiffs here came down with trichinosis 
more than a month before the persons involved in the 
other c.ases and plaintiffs here did not eat any mettwurst 
from Suhrmann's. Plaintiffs contracted trichinosis be-
fore any infested mettwurst was sold by Suhrmann as 
evidenced by the fact that the persons in those cases were 
regular mett1vurst eaters and they ate mettwurst from 
Suhrmann's all during the summer months and before, 
and did not come down with trichinosis until well into 
August. The earliest c.ase there was August 9th. The 
evidence in those cases established that the only source 
could be mettwurst from Suhrmann's while in the case 
at bar the only source could be the ground beef purchased 
from defendant. These plaintiffs had not traded at Suhr-
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1nann's since before May 1,1955 (315). Other cases have 
been filed against the defendant in the case at bar for 
selling trichina infested ground beef. 
The only case cited by defendant under this point of 
his brief is Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling Company, 
117 Utah 576, 218 P. 2d 660, which involved the 
explosion of a coke bottle. In that case it 'vas shown that 
many people had access to the bottle from the time it 
was delivered by the Coca Cola Bottling Company until 
plaintiff sought to open the bottle. In the case at b.ar, 
plaintiffs bought the ground beef and immediately took 
it home and mixed it into the spread described above. 
Plaintiffs here do not rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur, we here rely upon a breach of warranty and a 
violation of statute. 
We submit that under the evidence above set forth 
the verdict of the jury is supported by ample evidence 
and the trial court properly pernritted the jur~~ to make 
a determination of 'vhether or not the ground beef pre-
pared by defendant "~as adulterated and the source of 
the trichinosis contracted by these plaintiffs. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION 
NO. 5 AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 9. 
This ense \vas subn1itted to the jur~~ upon the si1nple 
proposition that if defendant sold to plaintiffs ground 
beef containing trichinae and this proxi1nately resulted 
in plaintiffs contracting trichino~is then defendant \Yas 
responsible for any da1nages proxi1nately resulting there-
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from. The jury was so informed by Instructions 3 and 
4 (79, 80). 
This is a correct statement of the law because if 
the beef sold contained trichina it would constitute (1) 
a violation of the Utah statutes referring to adulteration 
of foods, and ( 2) a breach of warranty. The instructions 
would be correct under either, or both, propositions and 
hence if one of these propositions is applicable the 
instruction is correct. 
Defendant is in error when it states that plaintiff 
relied solely on Section 60-1-15, Subdivision (1), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. Plaintiffs relied also upon Sub-
division 2 of that se·ction and upon the Utah statutes 
prohibiting the sale of adulterated food. 
VIOLATION OF ADULTERATION STATUTES 
Many courts, including this Court, hold that where 
a statute is violated the violator is negligent per se. 
Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal Co., 92 Utah 474, 69 P. 2d 
502; Wilcox v. Wunderlich, 73 Utah 1, 272 P. 207 ; 38 
Am. Jur. 827, Negligence, s,ection 158. This merely means 
that upon violation of the statute nothing further need be 
shown. If the statute, therefore, does not require by its 
terms knowledge on the part of the violator or a lack of 
due care to establish liability it i.s unnecessary for a 
plaintiff to prove either of such elements. 
In Donaldson v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 
186 Ga. 870, 199 S.E. 213, 128 A.L.R. 456, it was held 
that under statutes similar to the Utah statutes that it 
was unnecessary to prove either negligence in treating 
or knowledge of the adulteration of the food in order to 
constitute a violation of the statute and to visit liability 
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on the violator. See also the annotations to the same 
effect found at 128 A.L.R. 464 and 28 A.L.R. 1384. 
The Utah statute Section 4-20-5 Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953 provides: 
"Every person who manufactures for sale, 
sells, exchanges or delivers, or offers to sell, ex-
change or deliver, or has in his possession with 
intent to sell, exchange or deliver, any adulterated 
or misbranded drug, or article of food, drink, 
or confectionery, or wh·o adulterates or misbrands 
any article of food, drink, drug or confectionery, 
is guilty of a misdemeanor." 
S,ection 4-20-8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, so far as 
material here defines adulteration as follows: 
"For the purpose of this chapter an article 
shall be deemed to be adulterated:" * * * * *"In 
the case of foods:"* * * * (5) "If it contains any 
added poisonous or other added deleterious in-
gredients which may render such article injurious 
to health." * * * * (7) "If it consists in whole or 
in part of a filthy, decon1posed or putrid animal 
or vegetable substance or any portion of any 
animal unfit for food ('vhether n1anufactured or 
not), or if it is a product of a diseased anintal or 
one that has died other,vise than by slaughter." 
Trichina could only co1ne fro1n pork. Plaintiffs could 
only have contracted trichinosis fron1 eating the ground 
beef purchased from defendant. The presence of this 
trichina in the ground beef "~as certainly an added 
deleterious ingredient "~hirh rendered the beef injuriou~ 
to health. Also, because of its presence the beef con-
tained a portion of an anilnal unfit for food and this 
trichina \vas the product of a diseased anilnal. Hence~ 
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the proof here established a violation of the statutes of 
the State of Utah and under them it was unnecessary 
to prove either knowledge or lack of care so far as the 
adulteration of the food was concerned. Instructions 3 
and 4 were therefore, justified under, these statutes. 
In the case of Troietto v. G. H. Hammond Company, 
110 F. 2d 135, similar statutes were involved. The trial 
court had directed a verdict in favor of defendant and 
on appeal this was reversed. The evidence indicated 
that plaintiff ate meat halls made from fresh pork and 
beef purchased from defendant. As a result he contracted 
triehino.sis. The court stated: 
"We .are of the opinion that pork that is in-
fected with trichinella is diseased within the 
meaning of the Ohio Pure Foods Law. Allen v. 
Marvin, 46 Wkly. Law Bul. 208, affirmed, 64 
Ohio St. 608, 61 N.E. 1139. Its sale, even when 
the seller has no knowledge that it is diseased or 
infected, violates the statute and the seller is 
negligent in law. Allen v. Marvin, supra; Portage 
Markets Co. v. George, 111 Ohio St. 775, 146 N.E. 
283; Gre.at Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Hughes, 
131 Ohio St. 501, 3 N.E. 2d 415, Cf. Schell v. 
DuBois, Adm'r, 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664, 
L.R.A. 1917 A, 710. 
"When appellant's testimony was concluded, 
there was substantial evidence from which the 
jury could have found that appellant's illness 
was caused by his eating pork that was infected 
with trichinella when sold by appellees; and, 
under Ohio law, the court should h.ave instructed 
the jury that if they found these facts appellees 
were negligent in law. See cases cited above. If 
appellees were thus negligent, it appears to be 
well settled, under Ohio law, that their negligence 
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was the proximate cause of appellant's injury, 
even though another's negligence may have con-
tributed thereto." 
In Leonardi v. Habermann Provision Co., 143 Ohio 
St. 623, 56 N.E. 2d 232, action wa.s brought for damages 
resulting from trichinosis and the action was based on 
violation of the statute. It was held that neither knowl-
edge nor lack of due care need be proven .and the court 
stated: 
"The inhibition of the statute against the sale 
of unwholesome food or infected meat means that 
only wholesome food or uninfected meat may be 
lawfully sold. The definition of the term 'whole-
some' is 'sound, tending to promote health'; 'un-
infected' means untainted or uncontaminated, not 
affected unfavorably, not impregnated or per-
meated with that which is bad or harmful. Trich-
inae-infected meat does not qualify under these 
definitions. If it 'Yere kno·wn that fresh pork of-
fered over the counter for sale "~as infected with 
trichinae it 'Yould require much fortitude to assert 
that it was wholesome, uninfected and marketable, 
even though notice 'Yas given to the purchaser 
that all portions of it 1nu.st be sufficiently cooked 
to render it har1nless. The fact that it is not 
known to be infected at the tin1e of sale does not 
render it "~holesome or i1nprove its Inarketability. 
The statute, in effect prohibitive rather than 
directive, 'vas passed for the purpose of protecting 
and safeguarding the lives and health of the 
people. In harmony "~ith that purpose, this court 
takes the view that absolute liability is cast upon 
the defendant as the seller of n1eat infested 'vith 
triehinae, 'vithout regard to kno,vledge of its pres-
ence. Troietto v. G. H. Han11nond Co., 6 Cir., 
110 F. 2d 135. Any other rule "~ould generally 
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leave the injured purchaser, in his effort to place 
responsibility, without any practical remedy. This 
places a heavy burden upon the seller, but he 
Inay require a warranty from the person who sells 
the meat to him and is in a position to know 
whether the meat has been made safe by refriger-
ation." 
In Kelley v. John R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63, 181 
P.ac. 326, plaintiff recovered for illness and disability 
resulting from eating cooked and spiced pigs' feet sold 
by defendant to plaintiff's husband. Under a statute 
similar to that of Utah, the judgement for plaintiff was 
affirmed and the court stated: 
"The s.ale of adulterated food is absolutely 
prohibited. The seller is made the insurer of the 
purity of food products sold by him, and guilty 
knowledge on his part is. no longer an ingredient 
of the offense. The obligation imposed by the stat-
ute is personal, and cannot be avoided by showing 
that the i1npure food was purchased from a for-
eign concern, and bore the stamp of approval of 
the government inspectors." 
See also Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co., 138 Ohio 
St. 178, 34 N.E. 2d 202; Kurth v. Krumrne, 143 Ohio St. 
638, 56 N.E. 2d 227; Flynn v. Growers Outlet, Inc., 307 
}[ass. 373, 30 N .E. 2d 250. 
Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 9 would not 
be applicable to the law relating to a violation of statute. 
It only purported to relate to a warr.anty situation. It 
also was a mandatory instruction for defendant and 
\vould have required a verdict for defendant even though 
there was a violation statute. On this ground alone the 
trial court properly rejected this requested instruction. 
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It is submitted that under the foregoing authorities 
the sale of beef with trichina infested pork constituted 
a violation of the foregoing Utah statutes and the viola-
tion of these statutes, without more, was a basis for 
liability and responsibility for any damages proximately 
resulting from such violation. 
BREACH OF WARRANTY 
Plaintiffs in this case also relied upon the lTtah 
Statutes relating to implied warranties which so far as 
material here, provide as follows (Section 60-1-15, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953): 
"Implied warranties of quality. - Subject to 
the provisions of this title and of any statute in 
that behalf, there is no implied warranty or con-
dition as to the quality or fitness for an:~ par-
ticular purpose of goods supplied under a contract 
to sell or a sale, except as follows : 
" ( 1) Where the buyer, expressly or by im-
plication, makes known to the seller the particular 
purpose for which the goods are required, and it 
appears that the buyer relies on the seller"s skill 
or judgn1ent ('Yhether he is the grower or manu-
facturer or not)~ there is an in1plied ",.arranty that 
the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose: 
H ( 2) ,,~here the goods are bought by de-
scription from a seller ",.ho deals in goods of 
that description ( ",.hether he is the grower or 
1nanufacturer or not)~ there is an iinplied 'Yar-
ranty that the goods shall be of 111erchantable 
quality.'' 
Man~,. cases hold 'Yithout particular reference to 
any statute that ",.here food is sold for consu1nption, 
such ~ale carrie~ 'vith it an implied "'"arranty that the 
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food is wholesome .and fit for human consumption. This 
warranty is based upon public policy requiring protection 
to members of the public eating food provided by persons 
who make a business of manufacturing, preparing or 
selling such food. A good example is Decker & Sons v. 
Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828, 142 A.L.R. 1479. 
Suit was brought for damages resulting from eating 
sausage which was manufactured and sold under the 
trade name of "Cerfalet." In upholding plaintiff's verdict 
the court stated: 
"After h.aving considered the matter most 
carefully, we have reached the conclusion that the 
1nanufacturer is liable for the injurie.s sustained 
by the consumers of the products in question. 
''We think the manufacturer is liable in such 
a case under an implied warranty imposed by 
operation of law as a matter of public policy. We 
recognize that the authorities are by no means 
uniform, but we believe the better reasoning sup-
ports the rule which holds the manufacturer liable. 
Liability in such ease is not based on negligence, 
nor on a breach of the usual implied contractual 
warr.anty, but on the broad principle of the public 
policy to protect human health and life. It is a 
well-known fact that articles of food are manu-
factured and placed in the channels of commerce, 
with the intention that they shall pass from hand 
to hand until they .are finally used by some remote 
consumer. It is usually impracticable, if not inl-
possible, for the ultimate consumer to analyze the 
food and a.scertain whether or not it is suitable 
for human consumption. Since it has been packed 
and placed on the market as a food for hum.an 
consumption, and marked as such, the purchaser 
usually eats it or causes it to be served to his 
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family without the precaution of having it anal-
yzed by a technician to ascertain whether or not 
it is suitable for human consumption. In fact, 
in most instances the only satisfactory examina-
tion that could be made would be only at the time 
and place of the processing of the food. It seems 
to be the rule that where food products sold for 
human consumption are unfit for that purpose, 
there is such an utter failure of the purpose for 
which the food is sold, and the consequences of 
eating unsound food are so disastrous to human 
health and life, that the law imposes a warranty 
of purity in favor of the ultimate consumer as a 
matter of public policy. 
"Since very early times the common la"~ has 
applied more stringent rules to sales of food than 
to sales of other 1nerchandise. It has long been 
a well-established rule that in sales of food for 
domestic use there is an implied warranty that 
it is wholesome and fit for human consumption. 
Race v. Krum, 222 KY ±10, 118 XE 853, LRA 
1918F 1172; "'\\T eiden1an v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49 
KE 210; Houston Cotton Oil Co. '· Tramn1ell 
( Tex CiY A pp) 72 S\\ ... 2-!-!: 55 C J 7 6-!: 2± RCL 
195; 37 Tex Jur 299 .. A_ Inajorit~- of the Alneriean 
courts that haYe follo\ved this holding ha\e not 
based such "Tarrant~~ upon an in1plied tern1 in the 
contract behYeen buyer and seller, nor upon any 
reliance b~~ the buyer on the representation of 
the seller, but haYe ilnposed it a.s a 1natter of 
public poliey in order to discourage the sale of 
Ull\\Tholeso1ne food. H 
AnothPr out~ tanding ea~e on this subject is Tf'" eide-
Jnan ,r. ]( cll~c r, 171 Ill. 93, --l-9 N.E. :?10, \vherein the action 
was prPdicated on a breach of ilnplied \Yarranty to re-
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cover damages for illness from trichinosis. The court 
stated: 
"Where, however, articles of food are pur-
chased from a retail dealer for immediate con-
sumption, the consequences resulting from the 
purchase of an unsound article may be so serious 
and may prove so disastrous to the health and life 
of the consumer that public safety demands that 
there should be an implied warranty on the part 
of the vendor that the article sold is sound and 
fit for the use for which it was purchased. It 
may be said that the rule is a harsh one; but, as 
a general rule, in the sale of provisions the 
vendor has so many more· facilities for ascer-
taining the soundness or unsoundness of the arti-
cle offered for sale than are possessed by the 
purchaser, that it is much safer to hold the vendor 
liable than it would be to compel the purchaser 
to assume the risk. Moreover, we have a statute 
which makes it a crime for any per.son to sell 
or offer to sell, or keep for sale, flesh of any 
dise·ased animal.'' 
In N,elson v. West Coast Dairy Co., 5 vVa.sh. 2d 284, 
105 P. 2d 76, the court stated: 
"Where articles of food are sold for domestic 
use and immediate consumption, the law implies 
a warranty that such articles are sound, whole-
some, and fit to be consumed, and if the consumer 
is made sick through the consumption of such 
food, he has a right of action against the vendors 
thereof, either for breach of implied warranty, 
or for negligence; and in such action it is unneces-
sary either to allege or to prove scienter. Mazetti 
v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633, 48 
L.R.A., (N.S.) 213, Ann. Cas. 1915C·, 140; Flessher 
v. Carstens Packing Co., 93 Wash. 48, 160 P. 14; 
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Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 
176 N.W. 382,17 A.L.R. 649. 
"This subject has been frequently dealt with 
by the various courts of this country, with the 
result, as stated in the annotation (supplementing 
City of New Orleans v. Vinci, 153 La. 528, 96 So. 
110), appearing in 28 A.L.R. at page 1385, that 
'By the great weight of authority, the seller is 
under the duty of ascertaining at his peril whether 
an article of food conforms to the standard 
fixed by statute or ordinance; and the validity 
of regulations which, in express terms or b~~ con-
struction, dispense with scienter as a condition 
of the offense, is almost uniform!~~ held or as-
smned.'" 
Our lltah court in an action which arose prior to 
the enactment of the l-:-niform Sales Act, held that such 
an implied warranty exists in the sale of food. In Walters 
v. United Grocery Co., 51 lTtah 565, 172 Pac. -!73, plain-
tiff purchased fron1 defendant certain prepared foods 
such as potato salad and other edibles for immediate 
table con.sumption .and plaintiff bec~nne ill fro1n eating 
the food. A judginent for plaintiff 'Yas affirmed. Plain-
tiff did not prove that defendant "~as negligent in the 
preparation of the potato salad and so the question +o 
be determined by the court "~as "~hether the fact alone 
that the salad "~as stale and not fit for hun1an consump-
tion "~ould entitle plaintiff to recoYer. The court stated: 
"'"Vhile the authorities are not uniforin~ and 
there does not see1n to be any "~ell-defined uni-
versal rule governing the liabilitY of Yendors in 
the sale of food of all kinds for h"un1an consun1p-
ti.on, still I think it is fairly deducible fro1n the 
adjudicated cases, "'here the facts are such as 
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in the case at bar, that the vendor must be held 
liable when injury results from the consumption 
of such food." 
The court also stated : 
"But, as indicated, the weight of authority 
is to the effect that in a case such as the one 
under consideration, where the seller h.as prepared 
the goods, and there is nothing in the appearance 
of the goods or the odor to indicate- either to 
the seller or to the buyer that the combination 
is not fit for human consumption, the seller is 
liable. The opportunities and means of knowing 
the contents of the different ingredients that go 
to make up the salad, and the sources from which 
such ingredients are obtained, .are exclusively in 
his possession and knowledge, and cannot in any 
way be known to the purchaser. True, the food 
was seen by the purchaser, plaintiff herein, as 
well as the defendant; but, as stated, there was 
nothing about its appe.arance to indicate its im-
purity. Not only was the means of knowing the 
impurity of the food within the knowledge of 
the compounder and seller of such food, but it 
seems that he ought to be charged 'vith the re-
sponsibility for the injury resulting, for the 
reasons indicated." 
The court quoted with approval Weideman v. K,eller, 
supra, as follows : 
"As a general rule, we think the decided 
weight of authority in the United States is that, 
on all sales of meats or provisions for immediate 
domestic use by a retail dealer, there is an im-
plied warranty of fitness and wholesomeness for 
consumption.'' 
~fany ca.ses rule with plaintiff on the grounds that 
there is an implied warranty that the goods are reason-
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ably fit for the purpose for which they are purchased. 
Subdivision ( 1) of the implied warranty st.a tute requires 
that the seller either expressly or by implication kno'v 
the purpose for which the goods are purchased and the 
buyer must rely on the .seller's skill and judgment. In 
these cases a person selling food for human consumption 
knows the food will be used for that purpose and natur-
ally the buyer relies upon the skill and judgment of 
the seller to produce or sell the type of merchandise 
which will be suitable for the purpose of human con-
sumption. Particularly is this true in the situation pre-
sented by the case at bar. The ground beef "~as ground 
by defendant and placed on its display shelves in pack-
ages for persons to pick up, buy and eat. Defendant 
knew that the meat would be purchased for human con-
sumption. Inasmuch as this ground beef \Yas packaged~ 
of necessity the buyer relied upon the skill and judgment 
of the defendant in furnishing "~holesome food. It would 
be impossible for the customers to determine in a case 
like the one at bar "~hether or not the n1eat was whole-
soine. Customers are not ordinarily experts in deternlin-
ing the .,v~oleso1neness of n1eat and n1ust rely, as did 
plaintiffs, upon the skill and judg1nent of defendant. 
The 1neat "~.as in a package and could not be exan1ined. 
It 'viii not do to saY that under ordinarY and usual 
. . 
circu1nstanees ground beef is sold to be both cooked 
and eaten. In the first place, the purpose of the purchase 
was for hu1nan consun1ption and if this beef contained 
trichina loaded .sausage it ",.ould not 1neet tl1at require-
llten t. There is no reason to assm11e that this ground 
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beef would not be eaten raw or would be cooked to the 
extent that any trichina contained therein would be killed. 
To eat this as a spread is one of the ways ground beef 
is used. Particularly do Germans eat it this way (147, 
148, 170). Certainly many people like rare ground beef 
just as they like rare prime rib. There could be no as-
sumption on the part of defendant or any requirement 
on the part of plaintiffs that this ground beef should 
be cooked sufficiently to kill trichina. We are not dealing 
\vith a situation vvhere the sale is of r.aw pork. This 
was a sale of ground beef which turned out to have in 
it some sa usage. 
There are cases holding because of the fact that raw 
pork is sometimes infested with trichinae the warranty 
with its sale is that it is fit for human consumption 
when properly cooked. Defendant has cited these cases, 
Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. Co., 267 Mich. 690, 255 N.W. 414 
and Feinstein v. Reeves, 14 F. Supp. 167. There are cases 
holding the contrary even in pork cases. McSpedon v. 
K unz, 271 N. Y. 131, 2 N.E. 2d 513, 105 A.L.R. 1497; 
Greco v. J( resg,e Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E. 2d 557, 115 
.A .. L.R. 1020. 
In the McSpedon case, supra, the court supports its 
ruling by the following reasoning: 
HThis requisite of thorough heating and the 
nature of trichinae may see1n very simple things 
to us and to experts who are dealing with these 
1natters daily, but there are many people in this 
country who know nothing about trichinosis or 
the danger lurking in meats or the requisite heat-
ing point to destroy para.sites, and who must 
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rely, and do rely, upon the grocer and the butcher 
and such reputable concerns as Armour & Co. 
to sell them wholesale food. 
"This is the reason why we said in the 
Rinaldi Case that on every such sale of food by 
a dealer for immediate human consumption there 
is an implied warranty of its wholesomeness. 
* * *" 
This is not a case involving the sale of pork and as 
said in Mouren v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 139 
N.Y.S. 2d 375: 
"When a purchaser of pork knows he is buy-
ing pork, he can protect himself from the infection 
by thoroughly cooking the meat. Not knowing 
there was pork in the meat, it was cooked as 
hamburger and served rare on Saturday on which 
the meat wa.s purchased and on the following 
day." 
The reason for the rule announced in the pork cases 
holding the warranty is that the pork is wholeson1e only 
when properly cooked i.s obviously not present in a ground 
beef sale. There is no reason to protect against trichinae 
in beef and no need to cook it either at all or sufficiently 
to kill trichinae. Hence defendant's R.equested Instruc-
tion No. 9 \Yould be inapplicable to this case. The war-
rant~,. \Yas that the beef "-as fit for hun1an consun1ption 
and it \vas not lilnited to a situation " .. here cooked to 
eliminate trichinae. 
The follo\\-.. ing cases hold under a statute si.Inilar to 
the above quoted SubdiYision (1) that "'"here food is sold 
for hlunan eonslunption there "'"ill be in1plied a \varranty 
that such food is \Vholeso1ne .and reasonably fit for hu1nan 
consnn1pti.on: Ill cSpcdon Y. J(uJl.:·, 271 N.l~. 131, ~ X.E. 2d 
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513, 105 A.L.R. 1497; Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. 
.._t\.pp. 2d 687, 163 P. 2d -±70; Kline v. Duchess Sandwich 
Company, 14 Cal. 2d272, 93 P. 2d 799; Jensenv. Berris, 31 
Cal. App. 2d 537, 88 P. 2d 220; Gindraux v. Mau.rice Mer-
cantile Co., 4 Cal. 2d 204, 47 P. 2d 708; Charlis v. Hartloff, 
136 Kan. 823, 18 P. 2d 199; Swengel v. F & E Wholesale 
Grocery, 147 Kan. 555, 77 P. 2d 930; Rinaldi v. Mohican 
Co., 225 N.Y. 70, 121 N.E. -±71; Greco v. K r,esge Co., 277 
N.Y. 26, 12 N.E. 2d 557, 115 A.L.R. 1020; Ward v. Great 
.Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225, 
5 A.L.R. 242; Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 
161 A tl. 385, 90 A.L.R. 1260. 
In the Rinaldi case, supra, the court stated: 
"We think that the mere purchase by a custo-
mer from a retail dealer in foods of an .article 
ordinarily used for human consumption does by 
implication make known to the vendor the purpose 
for which the article is required. Such a trans-
action standing by itself permits no contrary in-
ferences. In this we agree with the courts of 
Massachusetts. Farrell v. Manhattan Market Co., 
198 Mass. 271-279, 21 Am. Neg. Case. 142, 84 N.EI 
481, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 884, 126 Am. St. Rep. 436, 
15 Ann. Cas. 1076. But we think, further, that 
such a purchase, where the buyer may assume 
that the seller has the opportunity to examine the 
article sold, unexplained, is also conclusive evi-
dence of reliance on the seller's skill or judgment.'' 
In the Sw,engel case, supra, the court stated: 
"We think that a Inerchant, in displaying arti-
cle.s of food for sale, impliedly warrants that each 
and all of the articles are fit, whether of well 
known or little known brands, or whether packaged 
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or not, and that the fact the purchaser chooses 
one or the other should not relieve the dealer. And 
if the dealer is liable, under the circumstances in-
stant in this case, so are the intermediate han-
dlers." 
We submit that under the evidence and these authori-
ties the defendant knew that the ground beef was to be 
used for human consumption and the plaintiffs relied 
upon the skill and judgment of the defendant in providing 
this packaged ground beef in a display counter and from 
this there was an implied warranty that the ground beef 
was fit for human consumption and that this was breached 
by defendant. 
Some cases hold that where food is purchased the 
implied warranty is not created by Subdivision (1), but 
is by Subdivision (2). One of the outstanding cases on 
this phase of the la"'" is Ryan v. Progressh·e Grocery 
Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N".E. -±85, 7-± A.L.R. 339. 
Plaintiff sued for breach of "~.arranty. He bought through 
his "rife as his agent, a loaf of bread "\Yhich had a pin 
concealed in it and "\Yhich i1ijured plaintiffs 1nouth. \\'hen 
the "Tife purchased the bread she asked the clerk for a 
loaf of '"\\'.ard~s Bread.~' The court held that there 'yas 
no implied "Tarranty that the goods "\Yould be reasonably 
fit for the purpose purchased because there 'Yas no reli-
ance by the 'vife on the skill or judgn1ent of defendant. 
Ho"TPver, in surh event the goods "Tere purchased by de-
Heri ption and hence there "Tas an ilnplied "\Yarr.anty of 
1nerehantabilitY 'vhich "Tas breached bv the sale of a loaf 
. . 
of bread containing a pin. In the case at b.ar if for any 
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reason there is no warranty under the Subdivision (1), 
then there is one under Subdivision (2). 
In the case at bar there was a sale of ground beef by 
defendant to plaintiffs under .a label of ground beef, but 
it was not as described or represented because it contain-
ed pork with trichina, and such beef could not be con-
sidered merchantable, or as it is defined, "saleable.'' See 
Wallace v. L.D. Clark &Son, 740kla. 208,174 Pac. 557, 
~1 A.L.R. 361; annotation at 21 A.L.R. 367. 
In the Ryan case, the court recognized that a case 
n1ay come under both subdivisions. The court stated: 
.. Most of the sales of defective food stuffs 
have been dealt with by the courts .as if subdivi-
sion 1 of the section defining warranties gave the 
exclusive rule to be applied. In some instances 
the goods were not purchased by description. In 
others, the courts may have been unmindful of the 
fact that the warranty of merchantable quality is 
no longer confined to manufacturers or growers. 
Innov.ation.s of this order are slow to make their 
vvay. Gradually, however, as the statute has be-
come better known, the bearing of subdivision 2 
upon sales of food in sealed containers has been 
perceived by court and counsel. The nature of the 
transaction must determine in each instance the 
rule to be applied. There are times when .a war-
ranty of fitness has no relation to a warranty of 
merchantable quality. This is so, for example., 
when machinery competently wrought is still in-
adequate for the use to which the buyer has given 
notice that it is likely to be applied. There are 
times, on the other h.and, when the warranties, 
coexist, in which event a recovery may be founded 
upon either. 'Fitness for a particular purpose 
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may be merely the equivalent of merchantability.~ 
Williston, Sales, vol. 1 § 235, and cases there cited. 
"A dual warranty is thus possible for food-
stuffs as for anything else. Both in this court and 
in others the possibility is recognized." 
Here ag.ain under a warranty of merchantability 
defendant's Requested In_struction No.9 was inapplicable 
and erroneous. This warranty is not based upon its use. 
The sole question is whether beef containing trichinae 
infested pork is merchantable or saleable. This requires 
an emphatic "no" answer and whether cooked or not 
cooked in preparation for human consumption the war-
ranty is breached when it is sold. 
We subn1it that under these authorities there was 
an implied warranty that the beef \Vas 'vholesoEle an~ 
re.asonably fit for human eonsumption and also that said 
beef was merchantable. That the beef contained pork "Tith 
trichina constituted a breach of these warranties and 
justified the trial court in sub1nitting the case to the jury 
on strict liability. If the jury found that the beef con-
tained trichina which caused plaintiffs to suffer trichi-
nosis then the verdict "\V.as properly for plaintiffs. 
DEFENDANT'S AUTHORITIES 
The three authorities cited by defendants are not 
concerned with a situation involYing the sale of beef con-
taining trichina. Two of the cases relate to a sale of pork 
products. In Chez.i v. Cudahy Bros. Co., 267 1\Iich. 690, 
255 N.W. 414, plaintiff sought to recover both on negli-
gence and breach of "\Yarranty. He "\Yas not pern1itted 
to recover on either. He did not prove negligence and 
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the court held there was no implied warranty that pork 
is fit for human consumption in a raw state. We are not 
concerned with that situation. There is no reason why 
there should be no warranty that beef is fit for human 
consumption in a raw state. Beef is often eaten rare 
and need not be cooked to the extent that trichinae would 
be killed. There is no reason for a person not to eat 
raw beef, whereas in cases of pork the presence of trichi-
na in raw pork, in some instances, h.as caused courts to 
say there is no warranty while in a raw state. However, 
there are many cases contrary to this Michigan ca.Se and 
1nany cases where recovery has been .allowed where the 
plaintiff ate raw pork. They hold it is sold for food and 
hence should not contain anything which might be injur-
ious to health. There is no danger in eating raw ground 
beef unless there is some type of adulteration such as 
was found in the case at b.ar. 
Feinstein v. Reeves, 14 Fed. Sup. 167, is distinguish-
able on the same grounds as the Cheli case. 
Bennett v. Pilot Products Co., 120 Utah 474, 235 P. 
2d 525, deals with a situation where plaintiff was allergic 
to a hair preparation. It appe.ared that most people 
could use that preparation with safety, but it was not 
true with plaintiff. The case at bar is not one where 
certain people only are allergic to trichina. Anyone who 
becomes infested with this worm will get trichinosis. We 
submit that none of plaintiff's cases are in point here. 
CONCLUSION 
The testimony in this case raised a factual question 
as to whether or not the beef purchased from defendant 
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contained sausage with trichinae and whether plaintiffs 
contracted trichinosis from this source. These questions 
of fact were properly submitted to the jury under legally 
correct Instructions No. 3 .and 4. This is established 
under Point I of this brief. 
Under Point II it appears that the matter was prop-
erly submitted to the jury on the basis of strict liability. 
If the facts were established as set forth under Point 
I then defendant would be responsible regardless of what 
care it used or what knowledge it had. It was both a 
violation of statute and a breach of implied warranty 
to sell beef adulterated with sausage containing trichina. 
We submit that the judgment in favor of plaintiff should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGs, WALLAcE, RoBERTs & BLACK 
CANNON & DuFFIN 
By BRIGHAM E. RoBERTS 
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